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Neely: Excessive Fees and Attorney Discipline: The Committee on Legal Et

EXCESSIVE FEES AND ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE:
THE COMMITTEE ON LEGAL
ETHICS v. TATTERSON
I.

INTRODUCTION

Few areas within the legal profession are as subject to differing
interpretations as the issue of what constitutes an excessive fee. No
single area of attorney conduct is more important or more susceptible to public scrutiny and criticism. For example, a report by the
Special Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes of thl American
Bar Association notes that "disputes concerning fees are universally
recognized as constituting the most serious problem in the relationship between the Bar and the public."' Furthermore, as Robert H.
Aronson notes in his study on fee arrangements, because lawyers
are the public's means of access to our judicial system, they "owe
a special ethical duty to society to ensure that the value of their
services is fairly measured." 2 In light of these considerations, it is
imperative that attorneys avoid charging excessive fees and develop
some standards by which to determine when fees are no longer reasonable or fair.
Recognizing the serious impact excessive fees have on the legal
profession, the justice system, and the public, lawyers, judges, academicians, politicians, and private citizens have addressed the issue
without reaching a clear consensus on what constitutes an excessive
fee. Part of the difficulty in determining the value of legal services
comes from the fact that to do so brings together two competing
considerations: 1) a need to preserve the effectiveness, integrity, and
independence of the profession and 2) a desire that all of society
be given reasonable access to the legal system. 3 To realize the first
consideration requires that attorneys be adequately compensated for

1. ABA Special Comm. on Resolution of Fee Disputes, The Resolution of Fee Disputes, A
Report and Model Bylaws 5 (undated).
2. Aronson, Attorney-Client Fee Arrangements: Regulation and Review 1980 FED. JUST. CENTER REP. 6.
3. ABA/BNA LAwYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, § 41:103 (1984).
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their services while the second consideration mandates that attorneys' fees be fair and reasonable in light of all the facts and cir4
cumstances of each particular attorney-client relationship.
Unfortunately, case law, ethical canons, and disciplinary rules on
the issue are, for the most part, relatively unproductive of definitive
standards by which to evaluate excessiveness. Rather, they provide
useful, general guidelines which can be used on a case-by-case basis.
Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson5 presented the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals its first opportunity to determine
whether and under what circumstances a legal fee is so clearly excessive as to warrant disciplinary action. The court took this opportunity to identify the standard of review and criteria it would
use to determine excessive fees, to reassert its authority and power
to regulate and discipline attorneys, and to reaffirm its commitment
to protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal
profession.
This Comment will identify the standard of review and criteria
used to determine excessive fees, analyze applications of the standard
by other state courts, and discuss the decision in Tatterson in terms
of the factors the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals found
to be relevant in assessing disciplinary sanctions.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On January 3, 1984, Mrs. Nellie Marie Herbert sought the advice
of attorney Ray Michael Tatterson regarding an insurance policy of
her deceased son in which she was named sole beneficiary. During
this meeting, no legal fees were discussed. In fact, Tatterson indicated to Mrs. Herbert that he did not intend to charge her a fee
for his assistance in obtaining the life insurance proceeds. 6 However,
approximately one month after the discussion, Tatterson entered into
a written contingent-fee contract with Mrs. Herbert which provided
that he was to collect all sums due her as sole beneficiary of her

4. Id.
5. Committee on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107 (f.
6. Id. at 109.
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deceased son's group life insurance policy. 7 Specifically, the contract

called for Tatterson to receive thirty-three percent of the gross recovery if settled without suit or forty-five percent if it was necessary
to go to trial. 8 At no time, however, was there any legitimate doubt
about the receipt of the life insurance proceeds. 9 Furthermore, the
majority of work Tatterson did to assist Mrs. Herbert was completed

before he prepared the written contingent-fee contract, during the
period of time in which his services supposedly were being provided
at no charge. Finally, at the time she signed the contract, Mrs.
Herbert was seventy-three years old, a widow, in poor health, and
legally blind. 0

The totality of Tatterson's efforts to recover the uncontested
insurance proceeds for Mrs. Herbert consisted of assisting her in
completing two standardized forms required by the insurance company and notarizing one of them, making two calls and writing one
letter to the personnel coordinator of the son's former employer (the
policy was a group life insurance policy provided by the employer),

sending the coordinator a copy of the son's death certificate, and
researching incontestability clauses in group life insurance policies
for four hours.,
Approximately four days after Mrs. Herbert signed the contingent-fee contract with Tatterson, the insurance company issued a
check in the amount of $61,661.81 in payment of the life insurance
proceeds and sent it to the personnel coordinator for forwarding to
Mrs. Herbert. 12 The coordinator sent the check to Tatterson. Shortly
7. Id. at 110.
8. Id.
9. Two potential problems which might have had an impact on the recovery of the proceeds
never materialized. First, Mrs. Herbert initially sought Tatterson's advice because she was distrustful
of her daughter, who was a co-administrator of the son's estate. However, the daughter had no
legitimate claim to the insurance proceeds, a fact known to Tatterson, and never interfered or asserted
any claim to the insurance proceeds. Second, the death of Mrs. Herbert's son was the result of suicide
and there was an initial concern that this might affect the recovery. The insurance company and
Tatterson soon determined, however, that the group life insurance policy contained a standard two.
year incontestability clause. Thus, there was never any real question as to the recovery of the proceeds
by Mrs. Herbert as sole beneficiary. Tatterson simply mispresented the potential risks involved to
Mrs. Herbert in order to justify the contingent-fee arrangement. Id. at 109, 112.
10. Id. at 109-11.
11. Id. at 109.
12. Id.
111. Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
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after receiving it, he delivered the check to Mrs. Herbert along with
a handwritten accounting of his services. The accounting reflected

a deduction of $20,334.63 as his fee for legal services. 13 Mrs. Herbert
endorsed the check, whereupon Tatterson collected his fee and de14
posited the net proceeds in a bank account for her.
Thereafter, Mrs. Herbert filed a complaint against Tatterson with

the West Virginia State Bar, claiming that Tatterson's fee was clearly
excessive.

5

The Committee on Legal Ethics (the Corfimittee) con-

ducted a preliminary investigation. An evidentiary hearing was held
before a subcommittee, which subsequently filed a report. Thereafter, the full Committee adopted the subcommittee's report and

filed a verified complaint with the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals. The Committee, in its complaint, sought disbarment of

Tatterson for his violation of various provisions of the disciplinary
rules, including charging an excessive fee and misrepresenting information to a client. 16 The Committee felt such a severe sanction

as disbarment was warranted in light of the fact that Tatterson's
violations of the disciplinary rules with respect to Mrs. Herbert oc-

curred while another disciplinary proceeding against him was pending. 17
The court concurred with the Committee's recommendation and,
on December 19, 1986, revoked Tatterson's license to practice law

in West Virginia.

8

It held that "charging of excessive contingency

13. Id.
14. "The report of the subcommittee conducting the evidentiary hearing in this case indicated
that the endorsement on the life insurance check was 'less than a mirror image' of Mrs. Herbert's
signature on the life insurance claim form or on the contingent-fee contract." Id. n.3.
15. Id.
16. W. VA. CODE OF PROrEssIoNAL RESPONSmLTY DR 2-106(A), & 1-102(A)(4), (6)(1983). (The
W. VA. CODE ismodeled after the ABA MODEL CODE OF PRoi'assioN L4REsPoNsimrBrY (1981)). DR
2-106(A) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal
or clearly excessive fee." DR 1-102(A), prohibiting certain types of misconduct, states, "[a] lawyer
shall not. . .(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. . .[or](6)
Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
17. On July 12, 1984, the court suspended Tatterson's license to practice law for six months.
In that proceeding, the first such disciplinary action against him, the court sanctioned Tatterson for
misrepresentation to clients and for failure to make an accounting of client funds. Committee on
Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 319 S.E.2d 381 (,V. Va. 1984).
18. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 116.
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fee to collect undisputed proceeds of life policy while other disciplinary proceedings are pending warrants disbarment." 19
III.

PRIOR LAW

A.

Identifying the Standard of Review for Legal Fees
1. The Pre-Code Standard: "Exorbitant, Unconscionable or
Radically Excessive"
Prior to the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, it was
generally accepted that charging an excessive fee was not grounds
for disciplinary sanctions without additional ethical violations being
present. 20 In fact, any inquiry into the appropriateness of the amount
of a legal fee was seen by many courts as an unwarranted interference with the freedom of attorneys to contract with their clients. 2'
In West Virginia, the right of attorneys to recover whatever sums
contracted for with clients and the validity of such contracts were
provided for by statute 2 and given judicial recognition by the State's
courts.2 Furthermore, fee contracts, whether express or implied, were
not limited as to amount and could be enforced under traditional
contract principles. 24
As a result of this focus on the preservation of the freedom to
contract, the benchmark for triggering judicial review of fees was
extremely high and narrow. For disciplinary action to be warranted,
it was necessary that a fee be "so exorbitant and wholly disproportionate to the services performed as to shock the conscience of
those to whose attention it was called ' 25 or involve other unprofessional conduct in violation of fiduciary duties (i.e., fraud). 26
19. Id. at 107.
20. See, e.g., In re Myrland, 54 Ariz. 284, 95 P.2d 56 (1939); Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Robinson,
32 Colo. 241, 75 P. 922 (1904); Grievance Comm'n v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 80 A. 767 (1911); People
ex rel Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Pio, 308 Ill.
128, 139 N.E. 45 (1923); In re Wiltse, 109 Wash. 261, 186
P. 848 (1920).
21. In re Gillaspie, 190 F. 88 (N.D.W. Va. 1911).
22. W. VA. CODE § 13 (1899); W. VA. CODE § 3772 (1906) (repealed).
23. See, e.g., Hubbard v. George, 81 W. Va. 538, 94 S.E. 974, (1918).
24. Watts v. West Virginia S.R. Co., 48 W. Va. 262, 37 S.E. 700 (1900).
25. Goldstone v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 490, 6 P.2d 513 (1931); accord, In re Annabel, 223 A.D.
539, 229 N.Y.S. 385 (1928).
26. In re Greer, 61 Wash. 2d 741, 380 P.2d 482 (1963).
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2. The Model Code Standard of "Clearly Excessive":
Widening the Scope of Ethical Inquiry
With the adoption of the Model Code of Professional Respon-

sibility, 27 many courts no longer required a showing of extreme excessiveness amounting to unconscionability or fraud in order for
disciplinary action to be imposed. Both ethics committees and the

judiciary began to scrutinize attorneys' fees more closely, using a
28
standard of "illegality" or "clear excess" as the new benchmark.

As a result, disciplinary authorities had only to prove that a lawyer
charged a "clearly excessive" fee to demonstrate an ethical violation.

29

Under Disciplinary Rule (DR) 2-106(A), a fee must be either

"illegal or clearly excessive" to warrant attention from disciplinary
authorities.30 "Clearly excessive" is defined in DR 2-106(B): "A fee

is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of
ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee.''31 In addition to this

subjective standard, the rule also provides a noninclusive list of eight
factors to be considered in determining whether a given fee exceeds

what would be "reasonable" under the circumstances.3 2
Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-18 outlines the important considerations in broader terms:
27. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first adopted the W. VA. CODE OF PROFESsioNAL REsPoNsiBILrrY in 1970.

28. MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBIxLY DR 2-106(A) (1981).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. W. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsIBmriy DR 2-106(B) (1983).
32. Id. The eight non-inclusive factors set forth in DR 2-106(B) to be considered as guides in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and
the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/13
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The determination of the reasonableness of a fee requires consideration of
all relevant circumstances, including those stated in the Disciplinary Rules. The

fees of a lawyer will vary according to many factors, including the time required,
his experience, ability, and reputation, the nature of the employment, the re3
sponsibility involved, and the result obtained.1

Unfortunately, although the standard of "reasonableness," as determined by a lawyer of ordinary prudence, theoretically broadens
the scope of ethical review for excessive fees, it also suffers from
imprecision, 34 offers little guidance- to lawyers, and leaves a great
deal of room for excessively high fees that still do not result in
disciplinary action. 35 As J. Lieberman comments in Crisis at the Bar:
A fee will thus be deemed excessive only when an ordinary lawyer reviews the

situation and, try though he may, cannot avoid the conclusion that the fee is
excessive. If he has any doubts, the fee must be within the bounds of professionalism. . . . About all that can be safely concluded is that a grossly inflated

fee is unethical.36

Case law on the issue of excessive fees is equally unproductive
of definitive standards. In comparison to other forms of judicial
misconduct, few attorneys are disciplined for violation of DR 2106. 37 As a result, there are few judicial opinions interpreting the
rule. Furthermore, some courts which have addressed the issue have
continued to require a showing of radical excessiveness amounting
to unconscionability or fraud in order for disciplinary action to be
imposed, despite the Model Code's focus on reasonableness under
38
the totality of the circumstances.
3. The Model Rules Standard: "Reasonable"Fees
For those courts which now adhere to the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,39 the scope of in33. W. VA. CODE OF PROFEssioNAL REsPoNsmrmtv EC 2-18 (1983).
34. Aronson, supra note 2, at 12.
35. Id. at 16.
36. J. LsBERMAN, CRisIs AT Tim BAR 108 (1978) (cited in Aronson, supra note 2, at 16).
37. Aronson, supra note 2, at 15.
38. See, e.g., Bushman v. State Bar, 11 Cal. 3d 558, 522 P.2d 312, 113 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1974);
In re Kutner, 78 Il. 2d 157, 399 N.E.2d 963 (1979).
39. MODEL RuLas OF PROFESSIONAL CoN.DUCr (1983). The West Virginia-Supreme Court of

Appeals currently has the proposed ethical rules under consideration. However, as of this writing, It
has not adopted the new rules and continues to adhere to the Model Code standard of clear exDisseminated
by The
Researchattorneys'
Repository
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quiry into attorney-client fee arrangements has been expanded even
further with the adoption of its standard which prohibits unreasonable as well as clearly excessive fees. Ethical Rule (ER) 1.5(a)
stipulates that a lawyer's fee must be "reasonable,' '40 thereby eliminating the need to show that a fee is "clearly excessive" in order
to warrant disciplinary action. The rule employs a list of non-inclusive factors for determining the41 reasonableness of a fee identical
to those set out in DR 2-106(B).
As a result of this focus on reasonableness, the benchmark for
triggering judicial review of fees has been lowered and its scope
broadened in those jurisdictions which have adopted the Model Rules.
For disciplinary action to be warranted, it is now only necessary
that a fee be unreasonable in proportion to the services performed.
B. Defining the Standard of "Clearly Excessive"
1. Where to Draw the Line
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the issue of what constitutes an excessive legal fee in the 1984 case of Myers v. Virginia
State Bar.42 In Myers, a three-judge court held that on those facts
and circumstances, Philip H. Myers, a state attorney, violated certain provisions of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
in his handling of an estate and ordered a six-month suspension of
his license to practice law. 43 In its suspension order, the court noted
that among other ethical violations, Myers had charged "clearly excessive" fees for the legal services he had performed on behalf of
his client. 44 On appeal, the supreme court affirmed, holding that the
three-judge court had presented ample evidence on which to conclude that Myers' fee was clearly excessive in proportion to the serv5
ices rendered.4

40.
sonable."
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

MODEL RULEs OF PRoFEssIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 states: "A lawyer's fee shall be rea-

Id.
Myers v, Virginia State Bar, 226 Va. 630, 312 S.E.2d 286 (1984).
Id. at 631, 312 S.E.2d at 287.
Id. at 632, 312 S.E.2d at 287.
Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss2/13
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Initially, Myers had been employed by Ira and Ruth Erwin to
prepare the couple's wills. He drafted these documents, naming himself as executor. 46 Approximately nine months later, Mr. Erwin died,
and Mrs. Erwin contacted Myers regarding settlement of her husband's estate. According to testimony from Mrs. Erwin and a son,
who was present during the meetings with Myers, Mrs. Erwin repeatedly inquired as to the cost to settle the estate. On each occasion,
Myers indicated that he had no idea what the cost would be and
refused to offer even a rough estimate.47
Subsequently, Myers listed his fee as executor as $500 in a filing
with the Commissioner of Accounts but presented Mrs. Erwin with
an accounting showing his fees as $4,910.48 Dissatisfied with Myers'
explanation of the fee and his handling of the estate, Mrs. Erwin
engaged new counsel who instituted several hearings, during which
Myers sought to justify his fee claiming that the $500 was for his
work on the estate while the $4,910 was his fee for non-estate work
done on behalf of the Erwins. 49 The three-judge court, finding Myers'
contentions contradictory and unconvincing, recommended a sixmonth suspension of his license to practice law.
After examining the findings of the three-judge court, the supreme court held that Myers had charged and collected a "clearly
excessive" fee.50 In reaching its decision, the court stressed that there
was a minimal amount of work for Myers to do in connection with
settling the estate. 51 Evidence showed that the value of the personal
property in the estate was $700. The value of the real estate was
$92,000, but all that property was held by the Erwins as tenants by
the entireties and passed to Mrs. Erwin upon her husband's death
as an operation of law.5 2 Furthermore, Myers' work on the nonestate matters amounted to no more than five and one-half hours
of work on out-of-state property issues and an uncertain amount

46. Id. at 633, 312 S.E.2d at 288.
47. Id. at 634, 312 S.E.2d at 288.
48. Id. at 634, 312 S.E.2d at 289.
49. Id. at 637, 312 S.E.2d at 290.
50. Id. at 640, 312 S.E.2d at 292.
51. Id. at 639, 312 S.E.2d at 291.
52. Id. by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
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of time on unnecessary and unavailing medical research.5 3 Given
these facts, the court stated that it was convinced "that Myers charged
and collected a clearly excessive fee for services rendered to the
54
Erwins" and affirmed the earlier suspension of his license.
The factors and analysis used by the Virginia Supreme Court in
Myers are representative of the approach employed by many courts
to determine when legal fees are "clearly excessive" in light of the
amount and complexity of the work involved. For example, in the
case of Kirby v. Liska, 5 an attorney charged a fee of $22,500 for
representing a client in a quiet title suit brought by the client's
brother. No novel or difficult legal matters were involved, and the
case was settled due largely to the efforts of the mother of -the
parties. The Nebraska Supreme Court found that any fee in excess
of $6,500 was unwarranted in light of these factors.5 6 Similarly, an
attorney who claimed to have spent eight hundred hours and charged
$46,500 for representing a client in a drug case which never went
to trial was found to have charged a grossly excessive fee. The court
determined that a competent attorney would have devoted approximately one hundred fifteen hours to the case and that the highest
fee charged by the attorneys representing the client's codefendants,
57
who went to trial, was only $12,000.
These cases illustrate the importance courts place on the amount
and complexity of the work involved when a question arises as to
the excessiveness of a fee. While the Model Code's "clearly excessive" standard leaves considerable room for excessively high fees
that do not result in disciplinary action, courts appear not to hesitate
to declare fees unacceptably excessive when the legal skills and professional time of the attorney are not required to resolve the client's
legal problem.

53. Id.
54. Id. at 640, 312 S.E.2d at 292.

55. Kirby v. Liska, 217 Neb. 848, 351 N.W.2d 421 (1984).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Strawser, 581 F. Supp. 875 (C.D. II. 1984) aff'd, 800 F.2d 704 (7th Cir.
1986).
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2. The Contingent Fee as a Violation of the "Clearly
Excessive" Standard
The question of whether and under what circumstances a contingent fee is so excessive as to warrant disciplinary action was addressed by the Supreme Court of Florida, in The Florida Bar v.
MoriberS8 In this case, the court suspended an attorney from the
practice of law for the sole offense of charging an excessive contingent fee, holding that the fee charged was not only excessive, but
"was so 'clearly excessive' as to constitute a violation of Disciplinary
Rule 2-106."s 9
Moriber entered into a written contingent-fee agreement with a
cint to collect all sums due the client as sole beneficiary of his
mother's estate 0 The agreement called for Moriber to receive onethird of the gross recovery of the estate if it was settled without
suit, or forty percent if it was necessary to resort to litigation., The
assets of the estate consisted of $23,126.10 from mutual trust funds
and $823.31 from other sources.6 2 Based on this recovery and the
contingent-fee agreement, Moriber calculated his fee to be $7,983.14
and notified his client that he would forward the balance to him
63
once the client executed a general release in favor of Moriber.
Thereafter, the Florida Bar filed a complaint. Following a judicial administrative proceeding, a referee found that the contingentfee agreement was improper under the circumstances in that there
was no real risk involved in settling the estate64 and that $2,500 was
a reasonable fee for the services rendered.6 5 The referee ordered Moriber to reimburse the client for the difference and recommended that
discipline by the court would only be warranted if he failed to make

58. Florida Bar v. Moriber, 314 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1975). For a comprehensive analysis of this
case see Turner, Attorney May Be Punished for Charging Excessive Fee Absent Aggravating Circumstances, Fraud, or Dishonesty, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 126 (1976).
59. Moriber, 314 So. 2d at 149.
60. Id. at 146.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 146-47.
63. Id. at 147.
64. Id.
65. Id.
Disseminated
by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
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the reimbursement.6 Moriber did not make the ordered reimbursement, and, in response, the referee added a forty-five day probation
from practicing law onto the reimbursement order.6 7 Following this
second order, Moriber still failed to make the reimbursement, and
the referee recommended that he be suspended for forty-five days.
At this point, the supreme court called for briefs from both sides.
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that the contingency fee charged by Moriber was so clearly excessive that it war68
ranted his suspension.
In undertaking its analysis to determine the excessiveness of the
fee, the court noted the broad spectrum of interpretations that exists
as to what constitutes excessive attorneys' fees.69 With this in mind,
the court reviewed the services Moriber performed in settling the
estate. These included, in addition to actual collection of the mutual
trust funds and other cash, writing approximately seven letters, completing a few forms, and making several telephone calls. 70 Utilizing
the eight factors outlined in DR 2-106(B) 7 ' as guidelines, the court
determined that the settlement of the estate required very little expenditure of time, did not involve any real risk or novel or difficult
7 2
legal issues, and "could have easily been performed by a layman."
As a defense to the charges of excessive fees, Moriber pointed
out to the court that his client had been fully informed as to the
contingent-fee arrangement and had entered into it freely.7 3 In response, the court first suggested that it was unlikely that the client
was familiar with legal practices concerning fees. Furthermore, the
court stated that even if the client were educated and dealing at
arms length, an attorney still could be subject to disciplinary sanctions if the fees charged were "grossly disproportionate to the services rendered." 74 On the basis of these findings, the court declared

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

147-48.
148.
149.
148.

71. MODEL CODE OF PRomSSIoxAL REsPONsmrrY DR 2-106(B) (1981).

72. Moriber, 314 So. 2d at 148.
73. Id. at 149.
74. Id.
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Moriber's use of a contingent-fee arrangement under the circum' 75
stances of the settlement of the estate to be "manifestly improper
and held that his fee was "clearly excessive," in violation of DR
2-106.76
Other courts similarly have found that, in the absence of any
real risk, an attorney's purported contingent fee which is grossly
disproportionate to the amount of work required qualifies as a clearly
excessive fee. For example, in the case of In re St. John, a New
York court found an attorney's contingent fee of $33,350 for processing a widow's claim for accidental death benefits on her husband's $100,000 life insurance policy to be so excessive as to constitute
an ethical violation when the matter involved a minimal amount of
time and did not present any real risk or unique difficulties for the
attorney. 77 Similarly, an attorney who induced the beneficiary of a
$4,000 life insurance policy to execute a fifty percent contingent-fee
contract to recover the policy proceeds was found to have charged
an unconscionable fee when he received $2,000 and his only real
work consisted of forty-seven hours spent to locate the beneficiary,
with no real legal problems involved in recovering the insurance
proceeds. 78 Likewise, a twenty-five percent contingent fee for assisting a client in obtaining fire insurance proceeds was found to be
clearly excessive within the meaning of DR 2-106(A) when the matter
involved an uncontested loss and the attorney's services consisted
of contading the insurer and accepting the proceeds check on behalf
79
of the client.

The decisions in Moriber, In re St. John, In re Stafford, and
Horton may be read in such a way as to infer from them that
contracts for contingent fees, because they generally have a greater
potential for overreaching of clients than a fixed-fee contract, will
be closely scrutinized by the courts where there is a question as to
their reasonableness. This close scrutiny arises from the duty of the
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
In re St. John, 43 A.D.2d 218, 219-22, 350 N.Y.S.2d 737, 738-40 (1974).
In re Stafford, 36 Wash. 2d 108, 113, 119, 216 P.2d 746, 748, 752 (1950).
Horton v. Butler, 387 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (La. Ct. App.) cert. denied, 394 So. 2d 607 (La.

1980).
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courts to guard against the charging and collection of clearly excessive fees, thereby fulfilling the primary purpose of attorney-disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the public and maintain
the integrity of the legal profession.
IV. ANALYsis

The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals adheres to the
Model Code standard of "clearly excessive" as its benchmark for
imposing disciplinary sanctions. 0 The court determines when an attorney's fee has exceeded that standard by applying the following
eight noninclusive factors set forth by DR 2-106(B):
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular

employment will preclude other emjloyment by the lawyer.
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

The
The
The
The

fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
amount involved and the results obtained.
limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.

(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
(8)

the services.
Whether the fee is fixed or contingent." 1

Using these factors as general criteria, the Supreme Court in
Tatterson addressed the appropriateness and reasonableness of a
contingent-fee agreement which entitled Tatterson to recover onethird of the uncontested proceeds of a life insurance policy. The
court found that even though the client had consented to the arrangement, the fee was "grossly disproportionate" to the services
rendered and, thus, "clearly excessive.''82 This finding was accurate
in light of the Model Code provisions for determining excessiveness
and case law regarding the nature and appropriate use of contingent
fees. In addition, the court held that this type of ethical violation
warrants disbarment when committed while other disciplinary proceedings are pending against the same attorney for similar violations. 83 The court based its decision to annul Tatterson's license on

80. W. VA. CODE OF PRoFEssIoNAL RE PONSmrLITY DR 2-106(A) (1983).
81. W. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmIY DR 2-106(B) (1983).

82. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 107.
83. Id.at 116.
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three distinct but interrelated considerations: that the fee was based
on a contingent-fee contract; that it was clearly excessive; and that
there was a prior disciplinary action pending.
The court first addressed the issue of whether, under the facts
and circumstances of this case, the contingent-fee contract was justifiable. Although contingent fees provide an avenue to the courthouse for people who otherwise would not be in a position to seek
vindication of their legal rights,8 4 they continue to generate concern
within the legal community and to attract close scrutiny by the courts.
The American Bar Association has acknowledged the necessity of
contingent fees. Ethical Consideration 2-20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility currently provides the general guidelines for
lawyers in West Virginia who enter into contingent-fee arrangements .85

Generally, courts have permitted the typically elevated contingent
fee only where the representation of the client involves a significant
degree of real risk. 6 "For this reason, the contingent fee is seen as
a reward to the attorney for her skill, diligence, ability and experience in prosecuting doubtful cases rather than as a payment for
the rendition of 'minor' services." 87 Furthermore, because contracts
for contingent fees have a greater potential for overreaching of clients than do fixed contracts, they are closely examined by the courts
where there is a question as to their reasonableness. 88 This close
scrutiny arises from the duty of the courts to guard against the
collection of clearly excessive fees. In so doing, the courts protect
the public and maintain the integrity of the legal profession 9

84. Adler, Lawyers' Fees: A CornucopiaFor Client Complaints, 1987 Aiuz. ST. L.J. 71, 83.
85. EC 2-20 provides as follows:

• . .Although a lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily improper for
a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a case, to enter into a contingent
fee contract in a civil case with any client who, after being fully informed of all relevant

factors, desires that arrangement.
See also Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 113 n.8.
86. Aronson, supra note 2, at 75.
87. Id. (citing Dorr v. Camden, 55 W. Va. 226, 46 S.E. 1014 (1904)).
88. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 114.
89. F. MAcKINNON, CONTiNGENT Fs fOR LEoAL SERvicEs, 44-45 (1964).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 2 [1988], Art. 13

19871

EXCESSIVE FEES

After examining the evidence presented by the Committee in this
case, 90 the court concurred with its finding that "the full, preponderant and clear evidence shows that there never was any doubt
about the receipt of the life insurance proceeds." 91 In its analysis,
the court first pointed out that the contingent-fee contract, prepared
by Tatterson, itself indicated that the contingent fee was in consideration of "recovering" the life insurance proceeds, not in consideration of other legal services he provided to Mrs. Herbert. 92 The
court also concluded that any question raised by the fact that the
son had committed suicide was insubstantial and unwarranted; twoyear incontestability clauses in group life insurance policies are standard, and Tatterson discovered this information before preparing
the written contingent-fee contract. 93 Finally, the court gave scant
consideration to Tatterson's contention that there was a potential
problem due to a possible claim or interference by Mrs. Herbert's
daughter. It dismissed this argument as being "ethereal at all times,
not just from hindsight." ' 94 Moved by these facts, the court declared
that Tatterson's misrepresentations to Mrs. Herbert concerning the
difficulty in obtaining the life insurance proceeds and the blatant
overreaching in this case were "egregious and unconscionable.'95
The court next reached the question of whether, under the facts
of this case, the fee charged by Tatterson was excessive for the legal
services he rendered to Mrs. Herbert. At the outset, the court acknowledged the importance of determination of a proper fee as a

90. The court noted that the Committee had shouldered the necessary burden of proof for this
type of disciplinary action. Specifically, that burden requires the following:
In a court proceeding initiated by the Committee on Legal Ethics of the West Virginia State
Bar to annul [or suspend] the license of an attorney to practice law, the burden is on the
Committee to prove, by full, preponderating and clear evidence, the charges contained in
the Committee's complaint.
Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 108.
91. Id. at 112.
92. Tatterson contended that the contract also covered preparation of a will for Mrs. Herbert
and investigation of her son's suicide for a possible tort claim against the employer. The court emphatically rejected this defense and declared that "these 'services' were contrived attempts to exaggerate
the true nature of the respondent's minimal services to justify the contingent fee where there was no

contingency." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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means to ensure that laypersons will utilize the legal system in protection of their rights and to guard against abuses of the professional
relationship between lawyer and client.9 6 Using the standard of
"clearly excessive" and applying each of the eight factors listed in
DR 2-106, the court found that Tatterson's efforts to recover the
life insurance proceeds and to research the incontestability statutes
involved very little expenditure of time; required very limited skills;
did not preclude employment; involved an amount which was actually obtained; did not require negotiation or litigation; were not
conducted under pressing time limitations; were the first professional
relationship between Tatterson and Mrs. Herbert; did not bring into
play any special experience, reputation or ability of Tatterson; and,
finally, involved a contingent fee rather than a fixed one. 97 Having
reached these conclusions, the court held that Tatterson had entered
into an agreement for, charged, and collected a "clearly excessive"
fee in violation of DR 2-106(A). 98
Having determined that the fee was "clearly excessive," the court
finally proceeded to determine the appropriate disciplinary sanction.
Historically, the court has Asserted that the principle purpose of
attorney disciplinary proceedings, including disbarment, is not to
punish the individual attorney but to preserve the purity of the bar
and to safeguard the public's interest in the administration of justice. 99
To ensure these safeguards, constitutional authority to define, regulate and control the practice of law in West Virginia is vested in
the Supreme Court of Appeals. 100 This authority includes the power
to admit and disbar attorneys. 1 1
In disciplinary proceedings, the court does not endeavor to establish a uniform standard of disciplinary action. 02 Instead, it de96. Id. at 113.
97. Id. at 112 n.6.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., In re Daniel, 153 W. Va. 839, 173 S.E.2d 153 (1970); Daily Gazette Co. v.
Committee on Legal Ethics, 326 S.E.2d 705 (V. Va. 1984). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at
Law §§ 18, 25.

100. W. VA. CODE §§ 30-2-7, 51-1-4a; W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 1; State Bar By-Laws, art. I,
§ 1; Carey v. Dostert, 294 S.E.2d 137 (W. Va. 1982).
101. Ird.
102. See, e.g., Committee on Legal Ethics v. Mullins, 159 W. Va. 647, 226 S.E.2d 427 (W. Va.
1976); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Woodyard, 321 S.E.2d 690; Committee on Legal Ethics v.
Higinbotham,
152 (W.
Va. 1986).
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cides whether and/or what disciplinary action is warranted by
°
considering the facts and circumstances in each particular case.1 3
However, there is one factor which the court automatically considers
in any disciplinary action against an attorney. That factor is whether
there has been any prior discipline for ethical violations. The court
considers the prior discipline of an attorney to be a very significant
factor in determining an appropriate disciplinary sanction against
the same attorney in a pending disciplinary proceeding. °" The court
considers prior discipline an aggravating factor "because it calls into
question the fitness of the attorney to continue to practice in a
profession imbued with a public trust."'0 5
The court began its determination of the appropriate disciplinary
sanction by stating that the impropriety of the contingent-fee arrangement under the circumstances of this case and the misrepresentations as to risk used to secure the arrangement were indicative
of a lack of consideration of Mrs. Herbert's interests and an abuse
of the attorney's professional relationship with her.'0 6 It then cited
the fact that Tatterson's disregard of ethical standards in his dealings
with Mrs. Herbert occurred while there was pending before the court
another disciplinary proceeding against him involving a very similar
"lack of consideration of the client's interests,"107 referring to his
prior discipline for misrepresentation of facts to clients. 08 Prior discipline of an attorney, the court opined, is a significant aggravating
factor in a pending disciplinary action. 10 9 The court then held that
"[fjulfillment of those objectives [protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession] requires that one [such
as the respondent] who has manifested the degree of insensitivity to
ethical standards demonstrated here and in the case disposed of earlier be disbarred." 10
103. Id.
104. Tatterson, 319 S.E.2d at 388; Committee on Legal Ethics v. Pence, 161 W. Va. 240, 25253, 240 S.E.2d 668, 674-75 (1977); Committee on Legal Ethics v. Daniel, 160 W. Va. 388, 395, 235
S.E.2d 369, 372 (1977).
105. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 115.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 116.
108. Tatterson, 319 S.E.2d 381.
109. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d at 115.
110. Id. at 116 (citing In re Teichner, 104 Il1. 2d 150, 168, 470 N.E.2d 972, 981 (1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1053 (1985).
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CONCLUSION

The Tatterson decision demonstrates the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals' commitment to protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the legal profession. Furthermore, it establishes the criteria the court will apply to future cases in which fees
are a central issue and highlights the significant role that prior sanctions will play in the court's determination of subsequent disciplinary
action. Finally, the court's close scrutiny of the contingent-fee contract in this case indicates its willingness to discipline an attorney
who charges a clearly excessive fee.
CassandraM. Neely
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